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1.  Intro 
 
In towns and cities across the country, the so-called “absentee” landlord and urban 
“slumlord” is viewed as a major source of problems, such as crime and neighborhood 
blight, that plague distressed neighborhoods.  According to conventional wisdom, non-
resident landlords are less likely to screen their tenants, to manage and maintain 
properties properly, and to have an interest in the wellbeing of the surrounding 
community (Dymowski 2001; Mayer 1981). The growth in external ownership and the 
problems associated with it have also been identified as sources of middle class flight 
from cities (Dymowski 2001).   
Given the preponderance of strong feelings on the issue, there is a surprising lack 
of empirical evidence to support the contention that rental property ownership and 
management characteristics influence property conditions and crime. A number of studies 
link homeownership and various types of positive outcomes (Dietz and Haurin 2003).  
These outcomes include lower crime (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999; Rephann 1999; Alba, 
Logan, and Bellair 1994), higher property values (Coulson, Hwang, and Imai 2003; Rohe 
and Stewart 1996), better building maintenance (Mayer 1981), more civic-minded 
neighbors (Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy 2002; DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Rohe 
and Stewart 1996), and better educated and well-adjusted children (Harkness and 
Newman 2002; Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy 2002).  Moreover, the prevalence of 
abandoned property has been found to be associated with greater crime (Spelman 1993). 
Therefore, it would seem plausible that rental ownership qualities such as the physical 
proximity of a landlord or property manager can influence crime in a rental setting as 
well. 
Additional attention to this issue is merited for at least three reasons.  First, there 
is a public perception that non-local landlords and poor property management cause 
many local crime problems.  Even within the social sciences, there is a growing 
recognition that researchers should “pay closer attention to the economics of property 
ownership and the management of places” (Eck and Wartell 1998).  Second, evidence 
suggests that the “absentee owned” share of the national rental inventory is increasing 
(Apgar 2004). With the growth of Internet real estate marketing, it has become much 
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easier for amateur investors to research, purchase, and rent apartments without ever 
actually visiting them. Third, high rates of tenancy can often be found in neighborhoods 
with higher crime levels. Therefore, understanding the characteristics of these properties 
could help in crafting policies to revitalize neighborhoods. 
This study seeks to contribute to our knowledge of how residential rental property 
ownership and management qualities affect crime.  It examines the incidence and 
frequency of certain types of crimes that occur in privately owned rental properties, 
including disturbances, assaults, and drug possession and distribution.  These crimes were 
selected because they are frequently found in a residential setting and are considered 
important measures or indicators of neighborhood “quality of life.”  Characteristics of 
rental properties are examined with the aid of count regression models that incorporate 
landlord, tenant, and neighborhood variables including residence of owner, size of 
landlord property holdings, tenant HUD Section 8 voucher use, and neighborhood 
socioeconomic characteristics.  It is hypothesized that problem properties are more likely 
to be found when the owner resides further away from the property, when the owner 
owns multiple units, when tenants receive public housing assistance, and when 
neighborhood measures of residential mobility and disadvantage are greater. 
The next section contains a review of literature that draws on Routine Activities 
Theory to explain intra-metropolitan or intra-urban variation in criminal activity.  The 
third section describes the study region and data used. The fourth section details the 
research hypotheses that motivate this study.  The fifth section explains the count 
regression techniques used.  The sixth section presents and discusses the empirical 
results.  The paper concludes with a summary and policy recommendations. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Whether stated explicitly or not, many studies of the geographical distribution of crime 
are motivated by Routine Activities Theory.  Rather than examining the economic or 
psychological aspects of the individual’s decision to commit a crime, Routine Activities 
Theory focuses on the “criminology of places,” that is to say the situational aspects such 
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as the physical, locational, functional, and management characteristics of the properties 
themselves (Cohen and Felson 1979).  The theory recognizes three factors that contribute 
to crime occurrence: (a) a motivated offender, (b) an attractive target, and (c) level of 
guardianship for the target.  Assuming the supply of motivated offenders is constant, 
geographical variation in crime occurs because of differences in the availability of targets 
and differences in levels of target guardianship. 
Places differ in terms of the presence of factors that contribute to crime 
commission.    For instance, shopping centers are likely to be viewed as more attractive 
targets for larceny than residences because of the abundance of new merchandise.  Places 
also differ with respect to the level of guardianship – for example, some stores employ 
better security measures (e.g., alarms, surveillance cameras, and security personnel). 
Furthermore, the available supply of motivated offenders, typically young males drawn 
from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, may differ from locale to locale.  
The social science literature has identified several key place-based factors that 
help measure target attractiveness, levels of guardianship, and supply of motivated 
offenders.  These variables include certain aspects of the local built environment such as 
ease of access (Hakim, Rengert, and Shachmurove 2001; Fishman, Hakim, and 
Shachmurove 1998), urban physical design features and property layout (Zelinka and 
Brennan 2001; Mazerolle and Terrill 1997), presence of security features (Hakim, 
Rengert, and Shachmurove 2001; Fishman, Hakim, and Shachmurove 1998; Hakim and 
Shachmurove 1996), commercial land uses (Olligschlaeger 1997; Hakim and 
Shachmurove 1996; Roncek and Maier 1991; Sherman, Gartin and Buerger 1989), local 
law enforcement or legal system characteristics (Hakim et al. 1979), and neighborhood 
socioeconomic characteristics (McNulty and Holloway 2000; Olligschlaeger 1997; Alba, 
Logan, and Bellair 1994; Roncek and Maier 1991). 
Property ownership and management characteristics have also received some 
consideration.  Roncek and Maier (1991) note that commercial bar establishments with 
management and security deficiencies experience more crime.  In a residential setting, 
homeownership may help insulate against crime (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999; Rephann 
1999; Alba, Logan, and Bellair 1994).   
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There are several reasons that homeowners might be both less likely to be 
victimized as well as less likely to commit crime.  First, homeowners are less mobile than 
tenants (Dietz and Haurin 2003; Rohe and Stewart 1996).  They are less likely to move 
because of the transaction costs associated with buying and selling.  As a result, they may 
have a heightened awareness of any changes in their surroundings and have established 
better neighborhood social networks (Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy 2002; DiPasquale 
and Glaeser 1999; Rohe and Stewart 1996). Second, homeowners are more likely to be 
sensitive to decreases in property values and changes in underlying quality of life factors 
such as crime that might detract from these values.  Their interest in preserving the value 
of properties creates a “vested interest in neighborhood conditions” (Rohe and Stewart 
1996) and a greater likelihood of investing in property maintenance and security (Dietz 
and Haurin 2003; Rohe and Stewart 1996).  Third, homeownership has been connected to 
better child outcomes (Dietz and Haurin 2003; Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy 2002; 
Harkness and Newman 2002).  This relationship may exist in part because homeowners 
exhibit lower household mobility which in turn fosters a more stable home environment.  
Therefore, homeowners may produce children who are less likely to engage in juvenile 
crime.  Fourth, homeownership has been linked to better physical and mental health 
outcomes (Dietz and Haurin 2003; Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy 2002).  Therefore, 
homeowners may be more resilient in stressful situations and less likely to react violently 
or unpredictably.   
Rental properties often have more criminal activity than owner-occupied 
dwellings, but differences also exist among rental properties.  For example, public 
ownership has been found to be associated with more crime (McNulty and Holloway 
2000; Roncek, Bell, and Francik 1981).  This finding may simply reflect other factors 
correlated with public housing such as tenant socioeconomic disadvantage and social 
isolation (McNulty and Holloway 2000), certain aspects of the built environment 
(Mazerolle and Terrill 1997) or apartment complex scale (Santiago, Galster, and Pettit 
2003; Roncek, Bell, and Francik 1981).  
Proper rental property management may also be important in controlling crime.  
Eck and Wartell (1998) find that “drug dealers select places that have weak 
management.” Weak management is often distinguished by lower levels of property 
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maintenance, less frequent visits by the owners and managers to the property, and fewer 
efforts to screen tenants.  Clarke and Bichler-Robertson (1998) suggest that management 
reduces rental property crime by applicant screening, eviction and improved security. 
Management quality is not directly observable and that presents a difficulty for 
empirical hypothesis testing.  Since poorly managed properties receive less maintenance 
and often exhibit signs of greater physical deterioration, the exterior appearance may 
provide a visual clue.  Ownership characteristics may also be important indicators.  
Apgar (2004) notes that many part-time “mom-and-pop” rental property investors lack 
the skills to manage and maintain rental housing.  The challenges of managing these 
properties may grow as the size of holdings expand.  Physical distance may also serve as 
a managerial impediment.  More remote owners may find it difficult to monitor the 
conditions that exist at their properties or communicate with tenants.  On the other hand, 
nearby owners will have both a greater stake in property conditions because of its effect 
on their own living space (Mayer 1981) or surrounding neighborhood.  
 
3.  Data  
 
The study area is the city of Cumberland (population 21,518) located in the economically 
lagging Appalachian region of Western Maryland.  The city has experienced a significant 
increase in the crime rate during the past 20 years.  This trend stands in marked contrast 
to the state and U.S., which have experienced substantial reductions in crime rates.  As a 
result, the crime rate now stands significantly higher than state and national averages and 
the reputation of the area as being a safe rural community has begun to be called into 
question. 
Compared to the U.S. and Maryland, the City of Cumberland has a relatively low 
rate of owner occupancy that has changed very little in the past 40 years.  According to 
the 2000 Census, approximately 58% of occupied housing units are owner occupied 
compared to 67.7% for Maryland and 66.2% for the U.S (U.S. Census 2000).  Much of 
the rental stock is located in the central older areas of town.  Those who reside outside 
city limits own over half of the units. Fewer than one in five property owners lives on the 
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same premises as the rental unit; this compares with one in four in a national survey 
(Savage 1998).   
Data for this study were combined from the following sources: 
 
City of Cumberland Police Department Incident Report Database.  This 
database records incident reports filed by city police in 2005. It contains information on 
approximately 25,000 incident reports based on emergency hotline calls and police 
observations including criminal incidents, traffic reports, and service calls.  Each incident 
report record contains an address, brief description of the nature of the call, time of call, 
investigating officer, and disposition of the case (e.g., closed, open, arrest). 
 
City of Cumberland Rental Unit Database.  This data contains information on 
3,134 privately owned registered rental units representing 1,480 properties within the 
City of Cumberland in 2005.  Rental registration is required by city ordinance.  
Comparisons of database records with 2000 Census counts of renter-occupied units 
suggest a very high rate of compliance.  Registered units are subject to an annual fee and 
must be inspected when an apartment unit changes tenants.  Some city rental units are not 
covered by the ordinance and thereby not represented in this database.  These include 
publicly owned rental units, privately owned units rented with Section 8 vouchers, and 
units that are rented/leased by agencies through programs that are sponsored by the state.  
These units are exempted because they are subject to other housing agency inspections.  
 
City of Cumberland HUD Section 8 Voucher Database.  This database contains 
approximately 436 addresses where HUD Section 8 vouchers were used in 2005.  The 
Section 8 program is administered differently than the rental unit database and records 
are filed separately. 
 
Maryland Office of Planning Property View data.  This database compiles 
information from the Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation on all real 
property for 2005.  It includes information on various characteristics of the property 
including street location, physical location in terms of latitudinal and longitudinal 
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coordinates, Census Block Group identification code, lot size, dwelling age, enclosed 
area, structure condition code, assessable value, and owner’s address. 
 
U.S. Census 2000 of Population and Housing.  This data contains Census Block 
Group level data on various population and housing characteristics for 2000 that were 
used to generate neighborhood indicators of socioeconomic level and housing quality. 
 
4.  Research Hypotheses 
 
The Uniform Crime Reports distinguishes between property and violent crimes.  This 
distinction is useful in as much as it highlights the severity of the crime as well as 
suggests possibly differing explanatory models.  Another distinction is sometimes made 
between “predatory or exploitive crimes” and “crimes that are mutualistic, competitive 
and individualistic” (Roncek and Maier 1991).  Arguments between familiar parties such 
as assaults would constitute “competitive” crimes whereas burglary would be considered 
“exploitative.” 
The role of place is likely to differ depending on the type of crime.  Sherman, 
Gartin and Buerger (1989) argue that  “predatory stranger” crimes are much more 
dependent on place than “competitive” crimes.  The presence of competitive crimes like 
domestic assaults and disturbances at certain residences “may simply indicate that certain 
buildings are receptors for the kind of people most likely to experience, or at least call 
police about, domestic problems; such calls might occur at the same rate no matter where 
they lived.” (p. 47) 
Eck and Wartell (1998) suggest that place characteristics such as property 
management may help explain variation in these kinds of problems as well.  When 
residents are more likely to engage in disruptive behavior, poor property management 
may be an accessory factor.  If disturbances and criminal activity originate in a particular 
rental unit and no attempt is made to notify the occupant that the conditions are disruptive 
to the neighborhood, one can conclude that the property has weak management. 
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In the case of owner-occupied residential properties, management is clear – the 
owner-occupant lives in the property and assumes principal responsibly for its 
maintenance and the conduct of its residents.  For rental properties, management is often 
more diffuse, ambiguous, and difficult to engage.  Leases may vary in terms of the 
management responsibilities assumed by the tenant (e.g., cutting the grass, sub-letting, 
allowance of smoking or pets).  Moreover, landlords may also live outside the 
community, making communication more challenging. Legal ownership forms such as 
partnerships and corporations may also hamper management contact. 
Rental property management quality may vary in other ways.  Non-local landlords 
should have fewer opportunities and greater costs for inspecting and monitoring their 
rental properties.  Property management may also differ based on the number of 
properties that are owned.  The part-time landlord may more effectively manage two 
properties than twenty.  Length of property ownership could also be important with more 
experienced landlords making better property managers.  Finally, the motivation for 
owning rental properties may influence the quality of management.  The landlord who 
invests in rental property to ensure a steady rental income may be a more attentive 
manager than the property speculator who invests to achieve short-term capital gains.   
Since management quality is not directly observable, this paper tests for several 
hypothetical correlates of property management (see table 4.1).   It is hypothesized that 
local owners that reside on the property (LEVEL1) are likely to be more effective 
property managers than those who live further away (LEVEL2-LEVEL7).  Moreover, 
because of the higher transactions costs associated with management from a distance, 
management quality is hypothesized to weaken with each increment in distance from the 
property.  In addition, it is hypothesized that there are diseconomies of scale in property 
management. As the number of units registered by the landlord (OWNUNITS) increases, 
property management quality decreases.  
Additional property, tenant, and neighborhood variables are introduced to control 
for other explanations for residential crime (see table 4.1).  The number of apartment 
units (UNITS) in a dwelling would be expected to increase the likelihood of crime 
occurrence there because of the greater number of households at risk.  It may also 
increase the likelihood of detection because of the close proximity of other tenants. The 
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only tenant level indicator available for this study is a dummy variable indicating whether 
a tenant of the property uses a HUD section 8 voucher to pay for rent (HUDUNIT).  This 
variable is used to control for tenant socioeconomic status.  A disadvantaged individual 
has a greater likelihood of engaging in criminal activity.  Therefore, the coefficient for 
this variable would be expected to be positive. 
Based on the criminal literature review, selected neighborhood variables are used 
as control variables. In defining the boundaries of neighborhoods, this study uses Census 
Block Groups from the 2000 U.S. Census.  The neighborhood variables include measures 
of residential stability (RESSTAB) and home ownership (OWNOCC) which are expected 
to be negatively associated with rental unit crime, measures of socioeconomic deprivation 
such as the percentage of households headed by female householders with children 
(FFHH), poverty rate (POVRATE), minority population percentage (MINPOP), 
unemployment rate (UNEMP), percentage of households receiving public assistant 
(PUBASS), and median household income (HHINC), and demographic factors which 
indicate populations with varied propensities to criminal activity such as the percentage 
of residents that is young males (MALEPOP), percentage of teenagers that is ‘drifters’ 
(YOUNGUN), and percentage of residents that is college educated (COLLPOP).  
The units of observation used in this study are individual properties with 
dwellings.  Usually, these properties are single-family homes, but in some instances they 
are attached structures such as residential duplexes, row houses, and 
condominium/apartment units within buildings.   
The dependent variables used in this study are the number of incident reports filed 
for individual properties for three separate categories of criminal incidents during the 
2005 calendar year: disturbances, assault (including domestic assault), and use or 
distribution of controlled dangerous substances such as cocaine, opiates, marijuana and 
barbiturates. 
Typically, a very small percentage of properties accounts for a relatively high 
percentage of crimes.  For instance, Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989) find that in 
Minneapolis over half of the police calls are generated by 3.3 percent of addresses.  
Moreover, domestic disturbance and assault calls are even more concentrated – all 
disturbance calls occur at nine percent and all assaults at seven percent of places.  The 
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data here show similar patterns.  Figure 4.1 shows the relative frequency of incident 
report counts for the three types of incidents.  Twenty-one percent of rental residences 
generate all of the disturbance incidence reports.  Thirteen percent of rental residences 
accounts for all of the assault reports and five percent accounts for all drug reports. 
 
5.  Model 
 
The dependent variable is a count that is best modeled using count regression models that 
take into account the discreteness, non-negativity, and non-linearity of the data 
generating process.  These models have advantages over linear regression because they 
conform more closely to the pattern of data generation observed and produce non-
negative predictions (Walters 2007; Cameron and Trivedi 2006; Grogger 1990).  
Moreover, they offer the possibility of estimation and inference improvements over the 
linear regression model.  The use of OLS with count data violates two fundamental 
assumptions of the Classical Linear Regression model.  When the appropriate model is 
non-linear, as is suggested by count data, bias is introduced.  In addition, application of 
OLS with count data results in error variance differences that violate the assumption of 
homoskedasticity (Walters 2007).  The possible alternative of transforming count data to 
dichotomous form and using non-linear bi-variate regression models such as logit or 
probit is not recommended because it results in a loss of information (Walters 2007). 
The reference point for developing count models is the Poisson distribution 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2006).  The Poisson distribution represents the probability of a 
count (y) of discrete events occurring during a designated time period as follows: 
. 0,1,2,...N    
!








      (1) 
In order to incorporate independent explanatory factors, Poisson regression allows µ to 
vary with each observation.  Independent variables are invoked to explain the variation in 
µi.  This can be represented as follows: 
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µi = E(yi | xi)=e
xiβ =e
β1 +β2x2i +...βkxki
   (2) 
The Poisson regression model (PRM) is somewhat restrictive because it has the property 
that both the mean and variance are the same – E(y)=V(y)=µ – a condition referred to as 
equidispersion.  Relatedly, Poisson count regressions also often result in lower 
predictions of zero counts than are realized in the data.  Choice of other count regression 
models that allow the variance to exceed the mean (a condition referred to as 
overdispersion) can rectify this problem.   
Three such models are presented here based on Cameron and Trivedi (2006) and 
Long and Freese (2006).  The first, the Negative Binomial Regression (NBRM), adjusts 
the Poisson model by introducing a random error (εi) that is independent of the 
independent variables (xi).  That is to say: 
µi = E(yi | xi) = e
xiβ = e
β
1 +β2x2i +...βkxki +ε
 (3) 
Assuming that E( ) is equal to one (equivalent to the assumption that the expected 
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where V( )≡α.  This results in E[y]=µ and V[y]= µ (1+ α µ).  So, α influences the 




The zero-inflated count (ZIP) model and zero-inflated negative binomial model 
(ZINB) achieve overdisperson by in effect mixing bi-variate and count models.  One 
assumes that observations can be divided into two latent groups.  The first group has no 
probability of event occurrence, perhaps because of some intrinsic qualities of the 
observation (e.g., in the example provided by this study, a rental dwelling is empty).  The 
other group has a probability of events occurring with frequency greater or equal to zero.   
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Probabilities for the model are computed as a weighted average of estimated probabilities 
of occurrence according to a bi-variate regression (e.g., logit or probit) and estimated 
probability of the number of occurrences according to the Poisson and Negative Binomial 
count regression models described earlier.  These models can more formally be 
represented as follows: 
 
Pr(y)= 1−Pr(0) () Pri (k)                 if y≥1
Pr(0)+ 1−Pr(0) () Pri (0)    if y=0 {  (5)  
 
where Pr(0) is the bi-variate model computed probability of zero occurrences and Pri(0) 
and Pri (k) are the count model computed probabilities of zero occurrences and k 
occurrences respectively.  For i=1 (where the count model is the Poisson), the model 
corresponds to the ZIP and for i=2 (where the count model is the Negative Binomial) the 
model is the ZINB.  The variables used in estimating the bi-variate regression may differ 
from those used in the count regression.   
 
6.  Results 
 
Regressions and diagnostic tests were conducted using STATA software’s count model 
procedures POISSON, NBREG, ZIP, ZINB, additional count model diagnostic programs 
LISTCOEF and COUNFIT (Long and Freese 2006), and collinearity diagnostic routine 
COLDIAG2 (Hendrickx 2004).  In order to form a more parsimonious set of explanatory 
variables, linear regression diagnostics such as the condition index, variance inflation 
factor (VIF), and pairwise correlations were examined for values that were unusually 
high.  Five variables were culled from the analysis including POVRATE, RENT, 
RESTAB, HHINC, and UNEMP resulting in a condition index of 25, a maximum VIF 
of less than two, and pairwise correlations below .53 in absolute value. 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the four different count regression models, 
Poisson, Negative Binomial, Zero Inflated Poisson, and Zero Inflated Negative Binomial 
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for disturbance counts.  The table shows the estimated coefficients, t test statistics, and 
exponentiated coefficients
1 for each of the models.  Since ZIP and ZINB are mixed 
models as explained above, they estimate two equations.  The second estimated equation 
represents the overall probability of a zero count; the first represents the probability for a 
non-zero count.  The same set of independent variables is used in estimating each 
equation.   
The results for the different estimation methods show certain similarities.  The 
coefficients for LEVEL2-LEVEL7 generally grow in magnitude indicating that crime 
increases as the property owner lives further away from a given rental property. This 
finding provides support for the hypothesis that management qualities differ between 
local and non-local landlords.  Larger rental property holdings (OWNUNITS) are also 
associated with higher counts suggesting diseconomies of scale in managing rental 
properties.  Non-ownership factors are statistically significant as well.  Having tenants in 
a rental property who use Section 8 vouchers (HUDUNIT) is associated with a greater 
frequency of incident reports as are neighborhoods with a lower percentage of owner-
occupied units (OWNOCC).  Disturbances may be exacerbated in neighborhoods where 
there are lower levels of residential stability and fewer stakeholders. Alternatively, 
problem properties may be concentrated in neighborhoods with low owner occupancy.   
Several diagnostic tests recommend the Negative Binomial regression model over 
the alternatives.  A likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that α=0 and provides 
evidence that the data is overdispersed, thereby disqualifying the Poisson model.  A 
visual inspection of Figure 6.1 shows that the mean predicted probability of the Negative 
Binomial model provides a better fit to the observed data than the other models.  This is 
further supported by the average residual of observed and average predicted counts 
(Mean |Diff|).
2  The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) model selection test statistic 
also supports the choice of the Negative Binomial regression model.   
Table 6.2 shows the results of Negative Binomial regressions for disturbances, 
assaults, and drugs.  For all three types of incidents, the magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients grow with the owner’s remoteness from the rental property.  This “ownership 
distance gradient” for crime is illustrated in Figure 6.2.  Section 8 voucher use at rental 
properties is also associated with more incident reports in each category.  In two of the 
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three regressions (disturbances and drugs), neighborhood owner-occupied housing rates 
are associated with lower activity.   
There are also notable differences among the results.  In contrast to disturbances, 
the size of landlord rental property holdings is not associated with more assault and drug 
incident reports.  In addition, for assaults and drugs, other neighborhood correlates are 
observed – percentage of college educated residents (COLLPOP) for assaults and 
minority population and young males (YOUNGUN) for drugs.  These results suggest, 
perhaps, that the exacerbating neighborhood conditions differ depending on the nature of 
the crime. 
One way of viewing the contribution of absentee ownership to disorderly 
properties is to predict the number of criminal incidents emanating from private rental 
dwellings assuming that all the rental properties have a landlord living on the site.  In this 
situation, the landlord is more likely to be selective of tenants, less accommodating to 
behavior and lifestyles which disturb the peace and harmony of the neighborhood, and 
more attentive to security.  By setting the LEVEL2-7 variables equal to zero (i.e., 
landlord lives in rental dwelling), one finds that the total number of disturbances drops 
from 776 to 512 (a 34% decrease), the number of assaults goes from 313 to 159 (a 49% 
decrease), and the number of drug incidents declines from 79 to 54 (a 32% decrease). 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study investigates how residential rental property ownership and management 
qualities affect crime.  For three types of incidents (disturbances, assaults, and drugs), 
landlord remoteness from properties is positively associated with reported criminal 
activity. This association may be caused by management quality deterioration due to the 
increased costs of conducting business from a distance or a remote landlord’s ability to 
ignore some of the external costs imposed by tenant misbehavior on neighbors.  Non-
resident landlords may be less selective in choice of tenants, more accommodating of 
behavior and lifestyles that they would not accept if located ‘next door’ to their own 
residence, and less likely to employ effective surveillance and security measures. 
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In instances such as this, there may be a role for local government to provide 
better information, education, and enforcement to improve landlord property 
management capabilities. These might include code enforcement activities to identify 
poorly managed properties, notification letters sent by the police department to landlords 
when criminal activity is detected in a rental dwelling, and mandatory landlord training to 
enhance management capabilities.  Other approaches might include establishing landlord 
licensing to disqualify inattentive landlords from operating rental properties and 
supporting the construction of professionally managed workforce or affordable housing 
projects to increase the availability of properly managed rental properties. 
The results here suggest a role for local government stewardship as well.  Section 
8 voucher recipients agree to certain restrictions when they accept subsidized housing.  In 
situations where enforcement is lax, Local Housing Authorities may leverage their 
position as a subsidy provider to improve tenant behavior.  Better enforcement would 
involve greater coordination between local police departments and housing assistance 
offices to identify disorderly and criminal tenants. 
Neighborhood based correlates of criminal activity are much less amenable to 
local government control than the aforementioned variables.  But, the results here suggest 
that neighborhood homeownership may decrease crime.  Promoting homeownership, 
especially among residents who lack the financial assets, credit history, income, or life 
skills is a challenge.  Moreover, homeownership may not be for everybody, such as 
frequent movers.  However, most renters would prefer to own and see renting as a 
negative experience (Fannie Mae 2001, 2003).   Therefore, programs designed to 
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Endnotes 
 
1 The exponentiated coefficient ( 
δ βk e ) is equal to the factor increase in the expected 
count when xk increases by δ, holding all other variables constant.  That is to say, 
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where PrObserved is the observed probability, PrPredicted is the estimated probability, N is the 
number of observations, and M is the maximum count. 
 
 
   17
References 
 
Alba RD, Logan JR, Bellair PE (1994) Living with crime: the implications of racial/ethnic differences in 
suburban location. Soc Forces 72:395-434 
Apgar W (2004) Rethinking rental housing: expanding the ability of rental housing to serve as a pathway to 
economic and social opportunity.  Harvard University, Joint Center for Housing Studies 
Cameron AC, Trivedi PK (2006) Regression analysis of count data.  Cambridge University Press, New 
York 
Clarke RV, Bichler-Robertson G (1998) Place managers, slumlords and crime in low rent apartment 
buildings. Sec J 11:11-19 
Cohen LE, Felson M (1979) Social change and crime rate trends: a routine activity approach.  Am Sociol 
Rev 44:588-608   
Coulson NE, Hwang S, Imai S (2003) The benefits of owner-occupation in neighborhoods. J Hous Res 
14:21-48 
Dietz RD, Haurin DR (2003) The social and private micro-level consequences of homeownership. J Urban 
Econ 54:401-450 
DiPasquale D, Glaeser EL (1999) Incentives and social capital: are homeowners better citizens? J Urban 
Econ 45:354-384 
Dymowski GR (2001)  Malicious landlords and problem properties: a policy white paper.  Metropolis St. 
Louis. November 1, 2001 
Eck JE, Wartell J (1998) Improving the management of rental properties with drug problems: a randomized 
experiment. Crime Prevention Studies, volume 9. Criminal Justice Press, Monsey, NY 
Fannie Mae (2001) Fannie Mae national housing survey 2001: examining the credit-impaired borrower.  
Washington, DC 
Fannie Mae (2003) Fannie Mae national housing survey 2003: understanding America’s homeownership 
gaps.  Washington, DC 
Fishman G, Hakim S, Shachmurove Y (1998) The use of household survey data—the probability of 
property crime victimization. J Econ Soc Meas 24:1-13 
Glaeser EL, Sacerdote B (1999) Why is there more crime in cities? J Polit Econ 107:225-258 
Grogger J (1990) The deterrent effect of capital punishment: an analysis of daily homicide counts.  J Am 
Stat Assoc 85:295-303 
Hakim S, Ovadia A, Sagi E, Weinblatt J (1979) Interjurisdictional spillover of crime and police 
expenditure.  Land Econ 55:200-212 
Hakim S, Shachmurove Y (1996) Spatial and temporal patterns of commercial burglaries: the evidence 
examined. Am J Econ Sociol 55:443-446 
Hakim S, Rengert GF, Shachmurove Y (2001) Target search of burglars: A revised economic model.  Pap  
Reg Sci 80:121-137 
   18
Harkness J, Newman SJ (2002) Homeownership for the poor in distressed neighborhoods: does this make 
sense? Hous Policy Debate 13:597-630 
Hendrickx J (2004)  COLDIAG2: Stata module to evaluate collinearity in linear regression.  Boston 
College Department of Economics: Statistical Software Components S445202.  
<http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s445202.html>, Accessed February 6, 2007 
Long JS, Freese J (2006) Regression models for categorical dependent variables using Stata. Stata Press, 
College Station, TX 
Mayer NS (1981) Rehabilitation decisions in rental housing: an empirical analysis.  J Urban Econ 10:76-94 
Mazerolle LG, Terrill W (1997) Problem-oriented policing in public housing: identifying the distribution of 
problem places. Polic 20:235-255 
McNulty T, Holloway SR (2000) Race, crime, and public housing in Atlanta: testing a conditional effect 
hypothesis. Soc Forces  79:707-729 
Olligschlaeger AM (1997) Spatial analysis of crime using GIS-based data: weighted spatial adaptive 
filtering and chaotic cellular forecasting with applications to street level drug markets.  Carnegie 
Mellon University 
Rephann TJ (1999) Links between rural development and crime.  Pap Reg Sci 78:365-386 
Rohe WM, Van Zandt S, McCarthy G (2002) Home ownership and access to opportunity.  Hous Stud 
17:51-61 
Rohe WM, Stewart LS (1996) Homeownership and neighborhood stability.  Hous Policy Debate 7:37-81 
Roncek, DW, Bell R, Francik JMA (1981) Housing projects and crime: testing a proximity hypothesis. Soc 
Probl  29:151-166 
Roncek DW, Maier PA (1991)  Bars, blocks, and crimes revisited: linking the theory of routine activities to 
the empiricism of ‘Hot Spots.’  Criminol 29:725-753 
Santiago AM, Galster GC, Pettit KLS (2003) Neighbourhood crime and scattered-site public housing. 
Urban Stud 40:2147-2163. 
Savage H (1998) What we have learned about properties, owners, and tenants from the 1995 property 
owners and managers survey. Current Housing Reports. H121/98-1. U.S. Census Bureau, 
Washington, DC 
Sherman LW, Gartin PR, Buerger ME (1989) Hot spots of predatory crime: Routine activities and the 
criminology of place. Criminol 27:27-55. 
Spelman W (1993) Abandoned buildings: magnets for crime? J Crim Justice 21:481-495. 
U.S. Census Bureau (2000)  Census 2000, Summary File 1, <http://factfinder.census.gov> Accessed 
February 2, 2007 
Walters GD (2007) Using Poisson class regression to analyze count data in correctional and forensic 
psychology: a relatively old solution to a relatively new problem. Crim Justice Behav 34:1659-
1674 
   19
Zelinka A, Brennan D (2001) SafeScape: creating safer, more livable communities through planning and 






























   20
Table 4.1  Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Description     ________________ 
 
Independent 
DISTURB  Number of reports filed for disturbances
a
ASSAULT  Number of reports filed for assault
a




HUDUNIT  Dwelling tenant uses Section 8 voucher
b
 
Rental dwelling characteristics 




LEVEL1  Owner lives in same dwelling
d
LEVEL2  Owner lives beyond LEVEL1 but in same neighborhood
d
LEVEL3  Owner lives beyond LEVEL2 but in city
d
LEVEL4  Owner lives beyond LEVEL3 but in same zipcode
 d
LEVEL5  Owner lives beyond LEVEL4 but within 60 miles of city
d
LEVEL6  Owner lives beyond LEVEL5 but within 500 miles of city
d
LEVEL7  Owner lives at least 500 miles from city
d




FFHH    Percentage of households that is female headed with children
e
RESSTAB    Percentage of residents 5 years and older who lives in same house  
    as in 1995
e
MINPOP Percentage  of  residents that is black
e
MALEPOP  Percentage of residents that is male 18-24 years of age
e
   21
COLLPOP  Percentage of residents 25 years and older that is college educated
e
YOUNGUN  Percentage of 16-19 year old residents that is not in school, not a  
    high school graduate, and unemployed
e
UNEMP Unemployment  rate
e
PUBASS  Percentage of households receiving public assistance income
e
POVRATE Poverty  rate
e
OWNOCC  Percentage of housing units owner-occupied
e
HHINC  Median household income
e




aCity of Cumberland Police Department Incident Report data (2005), 
b City of 
Cumberland Community Development Department Section 8 rental property database 
(2005), 
c City of Cumberland Community Development Department rental property 
database, 
d Property View, Maryland Office of Planning (2005), 
e U.S. Census (2000). 


































Table 6.1  Count Model Results for Disturbances 
    P R M       N B R M   
          β   t   
k e




LEVEL2  -0.0575  -0.33 0.944  0.1171  0.42 1.124 
LEVEL3  0.0286  0.19 1.029  0.2543  1.05 1.289 
LEVEL4 0.3834 2.73***  1.467  0.3586 1.53  1.431 
LEVEL5  0.5436  3.85*** 1.722  0.6565  2.65*** 1.928 
LEVEL6  0.8278  5.75*** 2.288  0.7898  2.93*** 2.203 
LEVEL7 0.5466 2.54** 1.727  0.6743 1.43  1.963 
OWNUNITS  0.0150  4.58*** 1.015  0.0190  2.38*** 1.019 
 
Tenant 
HUDUNIT  1.0525 13.89*** 2.865  0.9561  5.44*** 2.601 
 
Rental dwelling 
UNITS  -0.0018  -0.38 0.998  0.0486  1.24 1.050 
 
Neighborhood 
FFHH      0.0375 2.00** 1.038  0.4625 1.43  1.047 
MINPOP 0.0483  2.86*** 1.050  0.0356  1.05  1.036 
YOUNGUN 0.0197  3.28***  1.020  0.0147  1.36  1.015 
MALEPOP  -0.0365  -0.95 0.964 -0.0483  -0.69 0.953 
COLLPOP -0.0219  -2.86***  0.978  -0.01418  -1.26  0.986 
OWNOCC  -0.0119  -3.87** 0.988  -0.01237  -2.32** 0.988 
 
CONSTANT -1.2685  -3.87***    -1.4592  -2.55**   
 
Mean |Diff|    0.019      0.001 
BIC   3447.839      2551.449 
*** α =.01,  ** α=.05, * α=.01  
Table 6.1  Count Model Results for Disturbances continued 
   ZIP      ZINB           
         β     t 
k e
β          β t 
k e
β  
LEVEL2  -0.0535  -0.25 0.948  0.3807  0.95 1.463 
LEVEL3 -0.3315 -1.80*  0.718  -0.1810 -0.56  0.834 
LEVEL4 -0.3594 -2.08**  0.698  -0.0381 -0.12  0.963 
LEVEL5  0.1246  0.74 1.133  0.3645  1.12 1.440 
LEVEL6  0.0707  0.41 1.073  0.5256  1.56 1.691 
LEVEL7 0.2719 0.98  1.312  0.8326 1.65*  2.299 
OWNUNITS  -0.0043  -0.81 0.996 -0.0061  -0.79 0.994 
HUDUNIT 0.1163  1.13  1.123  0.7181  4.29***  2.051 
UNITS 0.1416  8.06***  1.152  0.0006  0.04  1.001 
FFHH      0.0507 2.15** 1.052  0.0479 1.15  1.049 
MINPOP  0.0128  0.63 1.013 -0.0168  -0.46 0.983 
YOUNGUN  0.0056  0.74 1.006  0.0004  0.03 1.000 
MALEPOP  0.0053  0.11 1.005  0.0619  0.68 1.064 
COLLPOP  0.0032 0.37  1.003  -0.0277  -1.98** 0.973 
OWNOCC -0.0082  -2.16**  0.992  -0.0109  -1.60  0.989 
CONSTANT  0.1908  0.49   -0.1307  -0.19  
  
LEVEL2  0.1948  0.59 1.215  0.8084  1.55 2.244 
LEVEL3 -0.5575 -1.98**  0.573  -0.7069 -1.28  0.493 
LEVEL4 -0.8616 -3.18*** 0.422  -0.5535 -1.18  0.575 
LEVEL5 -0.6200 -2.31**  0.538  -0.4061 -0.85  0.666 
LEVEL6 -0.7639 -2.59**  0.466  -0.3298 -0.62  0.719 
LEVEL7  -0.3804  -0.74 0.684  1.0198  1.03 2.773 
OWNUNITS  -0.0325 -3.03*** 1.033  -0.1114 -2.81*** 0.895 
HUDUNIT -1.0865  -6.21***  0.337  -0.3768  -0.62  0.686 
UNITS  0.0321 1.89*  0.968  -0.4423  -2.33** 0.643 
FFHH      0.0078  0.21 1.008 -0.0077  -0.10 0.992 
MINPOP  -0.6325  -1.68* 0.939  -0.1337  -1.75* 0.875 
  
YOUNGUN  -0.0168  -1.37 0.983 -0.0332  -1.35 0.967 
MALEPOP  0.0715  0.91 1.074  0.2026  1.35 1.225 
COLLPOP  0.0323 2.39** 1.033  -0.0090  -0.33  0.991 
OWNOCC  -0.0005  -0.01 1.000 -0.0059  -0.55 0.994 
CONSTANT  1.7674 2.68***   2.2566 1.72*   
 
Mean |Diff|    0.005      0.002 
BIC   2776.957      2596.039 
 
*** α =.01,  ** α=.05, * α=.01 
  



































Table 6.2  Negative Binomial Regression Model Results 
   DISTURB     ASSAULT      DRUG 
        β    t      
k e
β       β            t        
k e
β    β         t              
k e
β     
Ownership 
LEVEL2  0.1171 0.42 1.124  0.4656 1.35 1.593  -0.1097  -0.19 0.860 
LEVEL3  0.2543 1.05 1.290  0.6410 2.08**  1.898  0.1545 0.33 1.167 
LEVEL4  0.3586 1.53 1.431  0.7853 2.65***  2.193  0.4969 1.14 1.620 
LEVEL5  0.6565 2.65***  1.928  0.8466 2.73***  2.332  0.5698 1.29 1.762 
LEVEL6  0.7898 2.93***  2.203  1.0311 3.10***  2.804  0.9258 2.05**  2.526 
LEVEL7  0.6743 1.43 1.963  0.67051  1.23 1.955  0.5460 0.73 1.673 
OWNUNITS  0.0190  2.38**  1.019 0.01304 1.61  1.013 0.0021  0.18  1.004 
  
Rental dwelling 
UNITS  0.0486 1.24 1.050  -0.00909  -0.44 0.991  0.0114 0.66 1.011 
  
Tenant 
HUDUNIT  0.9561 5.44***  2.601  1.2261 7.02***  3.408  1.2756 5.36***  3.647 
 
Neighborhood 
FFHH     0.0463 1.43 1.047  0.0240 0.65 1.024  -0.6474  -0.81 0.951  
MINPOP  0.0356 1.05 1.036  0.0444 1.15 1.045  0.1148 2.17**  1.117 
YOUNGUN  0.0147 1.36 1.015  0.0046 0.38 1.005  0.0434 1.96**  1.041 
MALEPOP  -0.0483 -0.69  0.953  -0.0062 -0.08  0.994  -0.1909 -1.23  0.847 
COLLPOP  -0.0142 -1.26  0.986  -0.0283 -2.02**  0.972  -0.0414 -1.36  0.959 
OWNOCC  -0.0123 -2.32**  0.988  -0.0003 -0.04  1.000  -0.0221 -2.10**  0.979 
 
CONSTANT  -1.4592 -2.55**   -2.8741 -4.25***    -2.2091 -1.66*       
Pseudo R
2  0.0490     0.0597     0.1069 
 
*** α =.01,  ** α=.05, * α=.01 
  
Figure 6.2  Crime Level Ownership Distance Gradients 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1234567
Level
F
a
c
t
o
r
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
E
(
y
|
x
)
Disturbances
Assaults
Drugs
 